Optimal environmental taxation when green alternative is available by MAHENC Philippe
Optimal environmental taxation when green
alternative is available
Oliwia Kurtyka (Corresponding author),
LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics,
Manufacture des Tabacs, 21 allee de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse - FRANCE,
tel: +33 (0)5-61-12-88-17, Email: okurty@wp.pl
Philippe Mahenc
LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics,




1We extend the result of the environmental tax under imperfect
competition being below the Pigouvian level to an economy with a
polluting monopolist facing a green competitive fringe, where two sub-
stitutable varieties are supplied to heterogeneous buyers. The optimal
tax is shown to account for four e⁄ects: standard Pigouvian marginal
damage, monopoly subsidy, matching e⁄ect and business-switching ef-
fect. The last two e⁄ects however, are shown to split the market in
a socially desirable way when the regulator is "empathic". If he is
"non-empathic", the optimal tax is even smaller. Moreover, taxing
only buyers and not the polluting ￿rm leads to internalize buyers￿
externality in addition to the environmental one.
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2Optimal environmental taxation when
green alternative is available
1 Introduction
When pollution is generated by a monopolist￿ s activity, the environmental
regulator is confronted to a dilemma: the tax intended to internalize envi-
ronmental externality has the undesirable e⁄ect of even more reducing the
monopolist￿ s suboptimal output. Buchanan [4] was the ￿rst to point out this
problem. A well-known consequence is that the second-best optimal tax for
a polluting monopolist should be lower than the standard Pigouvian tax on
a perfectly competitive ￿rm (see [3], [22], or [21]).
This paper analyzes the robustness of this result in a more complex indus-
try where a polluting monopolist and a competitive fringe of clean producers
supply two di⁄erentiated varieties to buyers with heterogeneous tastes. The
presence of di⁄erentiated varieties on the market raises the problem of a
third source of allocative distortion adding to those respectively due to the
externality and the excessive market power of the monopolist. Such a mar-
ket structure is motivated by the examples of both electricity industry and
transportation industry.
What distinguishes the monopolist￿ s behavior in the present context is the
emergence of what we call the "business-switching e⁄ect" with reference to
3the business-stealing e⁄ect identi￿ed by Mankiw[17]. The business-switching
e⁄ect arises when the monopolist sets a price for the polluting variety di⁄er-
ent than the marginal cost of producing the green variety. The reason why
this is likely to occur is that the polluting variety is cheaper to produce than
the clean variety. However, when the regulator is "empathic" in the sense
that he cares about all costs borne by consumers, personal troubles included,
the business-switching e⁄ect is shown to split the market in a socially de-
sirable way. In other words, the presence on the market of a clean variety
sold at marginal cost raises a business-switching e⁄ect which does not distort
the market allocation more than what would prevail if the polluting variety
were the only one on the market. Thus, the environmental regulator has to
deal only with the two standard distortions caused by the externality and
the exercise of monopoly power. As a result, the environmental tax is an
e¢ cient instrument for achieving the dual objective of solving the monop-
olist￿ s tendency to underproduce and leading the monopolist to internalize
correctly costs of pollution: the second best tax is the Pigouvian tax less the
subsidy that corrects the monopolist￿ s tendency to underproduce. This ex-
tends the result pointed out by Lee[16] to a monopolist faced heterogeneous
buyers who have an opportunity to purchase a green variety supplied by a
competitive fringe.
However, the second best tax is shown to deviate from the standard level
when the regulator is "non-empathic", that is, he does not take into ac-
4count consumers￿personal trouble. In this case, the optimal tax turns out
to be even smaller because part of the externality is already internalized by
consumers￿environmental awareness.
We also allow for the possibility that the pollutant is sold by a foreign
￿rm and so a national regulator has no authority to tax this ￿rm. Instead,
the regulator must impose a tax on buyers and in￿ uence indirectly the mo-
nopolist￿ s strategy.
Our framework provides several new insights. First, it is shown that the
optimal tax accounts for four e⁄ects: the standard Pigouvian marginal dam-
age, the monopoly subsidy, the matching e⁄ect and the business-switching
e⁄ect. The ￿rst and the second e⁄ects are the usual e⁄ects that have been
studied in previous literature. Secondly, it might be optimal to subsidize
polluters even if there exists a clean alternative of production. It is what we
call business-switching e⁄ect. It is closely related to a well known business-
stealing e⁄ect, except that we do not consider entry issues here. Lastly, the
matching cost must be taken into account, which results in higher/smaller
taxation depending on the number of buyers deviating from the market cen-
ter. In case of empathic regulator, an additional e⁄ect is present, namely
the personal trouble e⁄ect. However, the last three e⁄ects exactly o⁄set each
other.
In case of foreign monopoly and buyers￿taxation, we show that the op-
timal tax consists of two terms: marginal damage and a positive term stem-
5ming from the externality which buyers of the monopolist￿ s variety exert on
each others.
The literature on environmental taxation concerns all forms of oligopoly:
homogeneous, heterogeneous, within Bertrand ([21]) and Cournot ([22]) frame-
work. However, all of them assume that buyers have homogeneous tastes.
To our knowledge, there is only one paper on environmental taxation with
heterogeneous buyers. Lange et al.[15] study optimal taxation in the circular
city with free entry. However, business-switching e⁄ect in our sense is not
present in their model as ￿rms have symmetric costs, and therefore charge the
same prices. In addition to our results, and in the spirit of Katsoulacos[12],
Lange et al.[15] ￿nd that in a model with heterogeneous buyers one can
also distinguish "free entry" e⁄ect. The corresponding point is that match-
ing e⁄ect may be o⁄set by the "￿xed cost" e⁄ect (but need not). In their
model, the increase in the matching cost due to the change in the number
of ￿rms can be neglected if the corresponding decrease in ￿xed cost is of
equal value. Moreover, they consider environmental taxation in price-setting
duopoly with di⁄erentiated commodities. However, the preference for dif-
ferentiation in their model stems from decreasing marginal utility, not from
di⁄erent tastes. Consumers buy both goods and do not have to take the al-
location decision by their own. Their results con￿rm the rule that imperfect
competition works in favor of the environment if ￿rms are not too di⁄erent.
This result also emerges in our framework.
6A part of the motivation of this paper is to stick closer to the real world.
Therefore, we compare two cases. First, a benchmark case in which the
regulator, either empathic or not, has the power to tax a polluting monopolist
and takes its pro￿t into account in the social welfare. Second, a second-best
problem where buyers are the only taxpayers and the monopolist￿ s pro￿t is
not taken into consideration in the social welfare. Third, we will study the
optimal subsidy for the clean sector.
The electricity industry is an example that ￿ts well to our framework.
Electricity utilities use di⁄erent inputs, some of which are polluting, like coal
or oil. The emission tax is not imposed on the suppliers of oil, since it is a
foreign monopoly (OPEC) whereas national utilities must pay the emission
tax. In some countries like France, households themselves can produce their
own energy from renewable resources and then sell it to the national producer
of electricity. Kotchen [14] mentions that buyers have an option to buy green
products with price premium, i.e., green electricity, that displaces pollution
emissions from electricity generated by fossil fuels. There exist conversion
possibilities that allow buyers to choose di⁄erent goods when price conditions
change ([23]).
Another example is given by the transportation industry. Car owners pay
the environmental tax on the diesel fuel for the sake of discouraging pollution.
It is not really for this purpose that oil retailers pay taxes, but rather to ex-
7tract part of the oil rent or to generate revenues1. Buyers￿taxes consist of the
ownership taxes like registration taxes, circulation taxes, taxes on insurance
etc. and taxes on fuel. Moreover, recent developments allow cost savings by
switching to bio-fuels. In Sweden, since 2003 a bio-fuel promotion program
is in place. Sweden plans to replace 15% of the fossil fuel consumption in
the transport sector with alternative fuels by 2010. However, it costs more
to run an ethanol bus than a diesel bus2. To promote a shift from a fossil-
based transport system to a bio-fuel based one, the government undertook a
tax strategy for alternative fuels fully exempting them from CO2 and energy
taxes. Furthermore, intensive R&D activities were carried out. Environment
friendly car companies were attributed reduced bene￿ts for tax purposes for
limited periods3. Moreover, existing car engines can be easily modi￿ed for
1In France there are two types of taxes on the oil imports. First, there is a TIPP
(Taxe IntØrieure sur les Produits PØtroliers) which represents up to 80 % of the price
of fuel. In 2001 the government introduced a stabilizer to make sure that the ￿scal
revenue does not change much with the world price of oil. This suggests that this
tax is primarily established for revenue purposes. The use of TGAP (Taxe GØnØrale
sur les ActivitØs Polluantes) on the carbon content bases, was extended in 2001 to
the intermediate energy consumption of ￿rms, especially those that use heavily the en-
ergy. Its main purpose is to ￿ght the global warming e⁄ect. To avoid double taxation,
the energy production is exempted from the taxation. It seems then natural to con-
clude that oil retailers pay mainly for revenue purposes and consumers for the environ-
mental ones. [Ministere de l￿ economie, des ￿nances et de l￿ industrie.[online] available
on: <www.mine￿.gouv.fr/fonds_documentaire/archives/communiques/c0010031.htm;
www.mine￿.gouv.fr/fonds_documentaire/archives/communiques/c0103201.htm>
- consulted on 19.02.2003]
2The di⁄erence is of about 1,000 US$ per month according to M￿nsson Tommy. This
extra cost is almost entirely due to the cost of ethanol.
3See: Memorandum of 18 June 2004 from the Energy,
Forestry and Basic Industries Unit of the Swedish Ministry of In-
dustry, Employment and Communications[online]. available on
<ec.europa.eu/energy/res/legislation/doc/biofuels/member_states/2003_30_sv_report_en.pdf>.
8bio-fuels, but at a cost. Examples encompass the city of Linkoping with six
diesel-based buses were converted to use biogas4 and the city of Trollhattan
where lorries for municipal refuse collection were converted.
All these examples suggest that environmental taxation of buyers is not
a theoretical nicety but an important issue that poses a host of challenging
questions. The problem of restricting taxation to buyers has been relatively
neglected in previous environmental studies.
The paper consists of four parts. In the ￿rst one, the basic model is
presented and the behavior of ￿rms and buyers is derived. In the second
section, the economy consists of both buyers and producers and the optimal
pollution tax is derived. The third section investigates the policy implications
of taxing buyers only. A ￿nal section presents conclusions.
2 The model
Consider the Hotelling [10] model with a unit mass of buyers uniformly dis-
tributed along a segment of unit length. Two di⁄erentiated varieties are
located at the two extremes of the segment. Both varieties are produced
with constant marginal cost and provide buyers with the same gross surplus
consulted on 5.01.2007
4According to: M￿nsson Tommy, Swedish e⁄orts in integrating bio-fuels
as alternative fuels for transportation in buses, lorries and cars, Proceed-
ings of the Internet Conference on Integrated Bio-Systems[online]. available
on <http://www.ias.unu.edu/proceedings/icibs/mansson/paper.htm> -consulted on
5.01.2007.
9of value v. Variety 1 located at the left extreme of the segment is sold at
price p by a monopolist who incurs marginal cost of production c1, whereas
variety 2 located at the right extreme is sold by a competitive fringe of small
producers at a price equal to marginal cost of production c2. Both vari-
eties are impure public goods (see [13] for a general de￿nition) in the sense
that they generate private consumption and a public good - environmental
quality- as a joint product. While the private good is horizontally di⁄erenti-
ated, environmental quality is a vertical attribute, hence buyers are willing
to pay more for a cleaner variety. Variety 1 generates polluting externalities,
whereas variety 2 is environmentally clean. For example, variety 1 and va-
riety 2 can be seen as high carbon fuels and low carbon fuels, respectively5.
The polluting variety is assumed to be less costly to produce than the clean
variety, hence c1 < c2.
When purchasing either variety, buyers pay matching cost t ￿ 0 per unit
of distance, which represents a utility loss from using a variety that does
not perfectly cater for their needs. Any kind of energy, for instance, needs
to be adapted to the good it complements, in which case t stands for the
technological cost of ￿tting the variety to its complementary good6. More
5e. g. coal and natural gas, either of both and nuclear energy, nuclear electricity and
photovoltaic or sun electricity, etc.
6It is easy to imagine several examples that can ￿t this framework. Soderholm [23]
￿nds that in Europe there are substantial possibilities to react ￿ exibly to price changes
on the market of fuel. There exist relatively cheap possibilities to convert existing plants.
For example, oil and coal ￿red plants can be converted to burn gas relatively fast and at
a low cost, but the reverse is more complicated (for details on the conversion time and
10generally, as the parameter t measures the degree of horizontal di⁄erentiation
between varieties here, it is also an index for the monopoly market power.
In addition to matching cost, buyers experience a personal trouble from
purchasing the polluting variety, measured by a cost ￿ ￿ 0 per unit of dis-
tance to this variety. If individuals are concerned with the environment to a
di⁄erent degree and are therefore heterogeneous with respect to their friendli-
ness for the clean environment, it is easy to imagine that this cost represents
a feeling of guilt accompanying the buyers when deciding upon the good
according to purely economic reasons7.
The polluting emissions e generated by variety 1 are assumed to be strictly
proportionate to the monopolist￿ s output X, i.e., e = ￿X, where ￿ > 0 is
an index for the environmental performance of the monopolist￿ s variety. The
damage from pollution is given by function D(e) with D0 (e) and D00 (e) > 0;
where primes denote derivatives.
Buyers are assumed to purchase at most one unit of variety. It is also
assumed that v is large enough for all buyers to ￿nd a variety for which their
surplus is positive in equilibrium. A buyer located at x 2 [0;1] derives a
surplus v￿p￿tx￿￿x from purchasing variety 1 at price p, and v￿c2￿t(1 ￿ x)
costs, see pp. 81). Furthermore, oil is extracted by an oligopoly which sets its price in a
cartel (OPEC) while green input is more competitive and is sold by small producers. As
far as the transportation industry is concerned, existing car engines can be easily modi￿ed
for bio-fuels, but at a cost depending on the cars￿type.
7The assumption of a personal trouble due to pollution is somewhat related to the
disutility of pollution assumed by Eriksson [8] and more generally to what Andreoni [2]
calls "cold prickle".
11from purchasing variety 2 at price c2. The monopolist￿ s market share X
corresponds to the marginal buyer who is indi⁄erent between both varieties.
Thus, X solves equation:
v ￿ p ￿ tX ￿ ￿X = v ￿ c2 ￿ t(1 ￿ X): (1)
It follows that the monopolist￿ s demand function is given by:
X(p) =
c2 + t ￿ p
2t + ￿
: (2)
The assumption that c1 < c2 ensures that the presence of the monopolist￿ s
variety is socially e¢ cient since the monopolist would have a positive market
share with variety 1 even though it were sold at marginal cost, i.e., X(c1) > 0.
Moreover, we must have X(c1) < 1 in order to guarantee that it is socially
e¢ cient for the competitive fringe to have a positive market share with variety
2 when both varieties are sold at marginal cost. Hence, we will make the
assumption that c2 ￿ c1 < t + ￿.
Let "(p) ￿ ￿X0(p)p=X denote the price elasticity of the monopolist￿ s
demand and p the monopoly price. The ￿rst-order condition for pro￿t max-







12One can easily check that the second order condition is satis￿ed and the
monopolist￿ s demand at price p is X(p) =
t+c2￿c1
2(2t+￿). Note that "(p) =
t+c2+c1
t+c2￿c1 is
decreasing with t as it should be, for the less di⁄erentiated are both varieties,
the more price elastic is the demand for variety 1, hence the less powerful is
the monopolist.
2.1 The optimal environmental policy
2.1.1 Benchmark: national monopoly and the producer￿ s tax
The environmental regulator has the authority to impose an environmental
tax ￿ on each unit of polluting emissions generated by the monopolist. We
do not impose any conditions on the sign of the environmental tax. Following
Barnett [3], negative values of ￿ mean that it is a subsidy. This description
generally applies to the case where the monopolist￿ s production process is
polluting. A big national electricity incumbent surrounded by a small green
fringe ￿ts the framework 8.
The monopolist￿ s pro￿t is (p￿c1 ￿￿￿)X(p) and the ￿rst-order condition
is given by:
(p ￿ c1 ￿ ￿￿)X
0(p) + X(p) = 0; (4)
8For instance, the national monopoly EDF largely dominates the French market for
electricity and leaves a small part of the market to a competitive fringe of producers using
clean technologies, mostly renewables. Look at Glachant [9] for some interesting details
about the competitive fringe built around the French monopoly after the electricity reform.
13where X0(p) = ￿ 1
2t+￿. Thus, the monopolist must charge a price b p(￿)
given by:
b p(￿) =
t + c1 + c2 + ￿￿
2
: (5)
The environmental tax rises the monopoly price and thereby induces a
reduction in the sales volume for variety 1, as can be shown in the following
reduced-form of the monopolist￿ s demand
X(b p(￿)) =
c2 ￿ c1 + t ￿ ￿￿
2(2t + ￿)
: (6)
We will restrict attention to the cases where both the monopolist and the
competitive fringe have positive market shares and all buyers purchase the
good. Hence, we assume 0 < X(b p(￿)) < 1, which yields c2 ￿ c1 ￿ 3t ￿ 2￿ <
￿￿ < t + c2 ￿ c1.






; if X(b p(￿)) > 1
2 then
b p(￿) < c2. When ￿ = 0, setting the monopoly price below competitive fringe￿ s
cost implies that the monopolist captures over half of the market.
When the monopolist￿ s market share is higher than the rival￿ s market
share, it must be that the monopolist sets a price for the polluting vari-
ety below the marginal cost of producing the clean variety in response to
environmental taxation.
Let us now examine the regulator￿ s problem. Assuming a benevolent reg-
14ulator, we use the sum of buyers￿surplus and monopolist￿ s pro￿t as a welfare
measure. This raises the question of whether a benevolent regulator should
take into account buyers￿personal trouble when considering their surplus.
If this trouble stems from an observable and veri￿able injury (lung desease,
dirty laundry etc.) then the regulator should legitimately pay attention to it.
If, however, the personal trouble is either purely subjective or di¢ cult to ver-
ify, then the regulator may consider that it is beyond his scope. To determine
the optimal environmental tax we will consider ￿rst that the environmental
authority neglects buyers￿personal trouble.
"Non-empathic" environmental authority
It is usually recognized in the literature that the benevolent regulator con-
siders all possible bene￿ts and costs in the welfare function. However, this
should not be so obvious if buyers su⁄er from a personal trouble, especially
due to environmental performance of the variety they purchase. The inclu-
sion of the environmental damage in the welfare function already indicates
that the regulator takes care of the environmental externality. There is no
reason to include the environmental disutility from pollution borne by buyers.
Once the environmental externality has been taken care of, buyers should not
consider that characteristics in their utility.




that is when D(￿X) = 1
2￿X2. This need not be the case. When buyers have
heterogeneous perceptions of the environmental damage, personal trouble
can be below or above environmental damage.
The regulator seeks to maximize the welfare as a function of the environ-
mental tax:
W
NE(￿) = v￿c1X(b p(￿))￿c2[1￿X(b p(￿))]￿D(￿X(b p(￿)))￿T(X(b p(￿))); (7)
where T(X) is the social matching cost measured by the distance between
preferred and actual variety choice9. Note that the matching cost function
T(X) is minimized at X = 1
2 and the marginal matching cost depends on
the deviation of the monopolist￿ s market share from 1=2.












2 and T￿ (X)=2t(X ￿ 1
2).
16Note ￿rst that the main e⁄ect of the environmental tax is to reduce the
monopolist￿ s demand as shown by X0(b p(￿))b p0(￿) = ￿ ￿
2(2t+￿) < 0. Close
examination of (8) reveals that this reduction has three indirect e⁄ects on
welfare corresponding to the three terms between brackets. The ￿rst indirect
e⁄ect is negative since c2 > c1: the environmental tax makes some buyers of
variety 1 switch to the clean variety 2 which is more costly to produce. The
second indirect e⁄ect depends on the sign of T 0(X(b p(￿))): if T 0(X(b p(￿))) =
2t
￿
X(b p(￿)) ￿ 1
2
￿
> 0, that is the monopolist￿ s market share exceeds 1
2, then
the environmental tax lowers the matching cost, which is socially bene￿cial.
Finally, the third indirect e⁄ect is positive and corresponds to the standard
role assigned to the environmental tax, namely decreasing the monopolist￿ s
polluting emissions.
Balancing the three e⁄ects gives the following optimality condition for
the environmental tax:
c2 ￿ c1 = T
0(X(b p(￿))) + ￿D
0(￿X(b p(￿))): (9)
The left-hand side of (9) are the marginal savings due to the less costly,
albeit more polluting, variety produced by the monopolist. The right-hand
side of (9) is the sum of the marginal matching cost and the marginal damage
from pollution. By imposing an environmental tax on the monopolist, the
regulator seeks a price for the polluting variety such that the marginal savings
17to the monopolist is equal to the overall marginal social cost.
Using T 0(X(b p(￿))) = 2t
￿
X(b p(￿)) ￿ 1
2
￿
and the expression of the monop-
olist￿ s demand given in (6), condition (9) can be rewritten:





0(￿X(b p(￿))) ￿ c2 ￿ t): (10)
The equation above has a familiar ￿ avour. If ￿ = 0 then social e¢ ciency
requires that the price of the polluting variety just equals the sum of the
marginal private cost borne by the monopolist and the marginal damage
from pollution over all buyers. However, due to the personal trouble the
price induced by the regulator may be above or below the social marginal
cost.
Using the ￿rst-order condition (3) by substituting for c1 = b p(￿) ￿ ￿￿ +
X(b p(￿))





























￿ . It accounts for the external damage, market power, business-
switching e⁄ect and matching cost. It is below the standard environmental tax
under imperfect competition for all positive values of ￿.
18The determination of the optimal environmental tax leads to the emer-
gence of four terms. The ￿rst two terms on the right-side of (11) re￿ ect the
con￿ ict identi￿ed by Lee[16] and Barnett[3] between the welfare gain from in-
ternalizing the marginal damage from pollution D0(￿X(b p(￿NE￿)) which would
be equal to the standard Pigouvian tax on a perfectly competitive ￿rm, and
the welfare loss
X(b p(￿NE￿))
￿X0(b p(￿NE￿)) from reducing the monopolist￿ s suboptimal out-
put. The new insight here is the emergence of an additional con￿ ict between
two e⁄ects due to the presence of di⁄erentiated varieties on the market.
The ￿rst e⁄ect is a ￿business-switching e⁄ect￿which is reminiscent of the
business-stealing e⁄ect identi￿ed by Mankiw[17]. The business-switching ef-
fect arises when the tax induces the monopolist to set a price b p(￿NE￿) for the
polluting variety below the marginal cost of producing the green variety c2.
The price cut obviously results in some gain in social e¢ ciency. From Prop-
erty 1, the business-switching e⁄ect extends the monopolist￿ s market share
X(b p(￿NE￿)) to more than half the market. This rises the matching cost as
shown by the fourth term in (11), and so creates a welfare loss.
The last two e⁄ects, the matching e⁄ect and the business-switching ef-
fect exactly compensate each other if ￿ = 0, i.e. if the interest of con-
sumers when choosing where to allocate is perfectly aligned with the interest
of the regulator. If ￿ > 0, then the optimal tax is below the standard
environmental tax within imperfect competition. The intuition for this is
simple. If the environmental authority sets the tax at a standard level, i.e.
19￿￿ = D0(￿X(b p(￿￿))) +
X(b p(￿￿))
￿X0(b p(￿￿)), this will not lead to the socially e¢ cient
allocation. This is because buyers tend to choose competitive fringe more
often than is socially desirable. Even though the regulator corrects for the
two externalities: the environmental externality and the market power, buy-
ers double the environmental e⁄ort. Therefore, the regulator must further
decrease the tax.










t + c2 ￿ c1
￿
: (12)
Substituting the optimal tax in the formula for the marginal buyer, we
￿nd that X(
a
p(￿￿)) 6= 0 and is equal to socially optimal quantity of buyers10.
Note that the restriction for the market coverage is veri￿ed if and only if
c2 ￿ c1 ￿ 2t
2t+￿(t + ￿) < ￿D0(￿X) < c2 ￿ c1 + t so the monopoly is never
evicted.
"Empathic" environmental authority
Let us now consider that the environmental authority takes the personal




20trouble into account in the welfare function,
W
E(￿) = v￿c1X(b p(￿))￿c2[1￿X(b p(￿))]￿D(￿X(b p(￿)))￿T(X(b p(￿)))￿F(X);
(13)
where T(X) is the social matching cost as before and F(X) is the average
personal trouble from consuming the dirty variety.









As a result, the regulator equalizes the marginal savings due to the less costly
and more polluting variety with the total marginal social cost:
c2 ￿ c1 = T
0(X(b p(￿))) + F
0(X) + ￿D
0(￿X(b p(￿))); (15)
and sets the monopoly price:
b p(￿) = c1 + ￿D
0(￿X(b p(￿))): (16)
Contrary to the previous case with a regulator ignoring personal trouble, the
monopoly price is exactly equal to the social marginal cost.
Using the ￿rst-order condition (3) by substituting for c1 = b p(￿) ￿ ￿￿ +
21X(b p(￿))






























￿ . It accounts for the external damage, market power, business-
switching e⁄ect, matching cost and personal trouble.
Next proposition shows that the social gain from the positive business-
switching e⁄ect exactly o⁄sets the social loss from matching and personal
disutility.






; then b p(￿E￿) ￿ c2 =
2t
￿




The intuition behind this result is roughly that what a buyer gains by
switching to variety 1 sold at a price lower than c2, is lost in matching and
personal trouble.
To give some intuition to the result, note that when the tax is imposed,
the marginal buyer X(b p(￿E￿)) moves to the left as some buyers switch to
the clean variety. Assume that one buyer decides to change his mind. He
must give up a gross surplus of v ￿ p ￿ ￿X and accepts the surplus v ￿ c2.
The switching e⁄ect has a gross impact on the social welfare of a value
22(v￿c2)￿(v￿p￿￿X) = p+￿X ￿c2. On the other hand, the change in the
average matching cost amounts to 2tX ￿ t. Substituting for the indi⁄erent
buyer, it shows up that the change in the average matching cost equals to
c2￿p￿￿X, and cancels out with the change in gross surplus. The result holds
for the quadratic transportation cost, as well as for the multiple demand of
each buyer. In other words, to steal business of the monopoly, one must pay
the transportation cost.
In addition to our results Lange et al.[15] ￿nd that in a model with het-
erogeneous buyers one can also distinguish "free entry" e⁄ect. The corre-
sponding point is that matching e⁄ect may be o⁄set by the ￿ ￿xed cost￿e⁄ect
(but need not). In their model, the increase in the matching cost due to a de-
crease in the number of ￿rms can be neglected if the corresponding decrease
in ￿xed cost is of equal value.







then ￿E￿ = D0(￿X(b p(￿E￿))￿
b p(￿E￿)
￿"(b p(￿E￿)) restores the socially e¢ cient allocation.
The environmental regulator has to deal neither with the positive business-
switching e⁄ect nor with the negative matching e⁄ect since both automati-
cally compensate each other. Thus, the result that the optimal environmental
tax for a polluting monopolist should be lower than the Pigouvian tax is still
valid in the presence of a di⁄erentiated variety providing buyers with a clean
alternative. Finally, the optimal environmental tax achieves the dual task
of solving the monopolist￿ s tendency to underproduce while internalizing the
23costs of pollution.
To sum up, we ￿nd that the optimal tax in case of a polluting monopolist
is below the marginal damage as in [3]. Note that Xp = ￿ 1
2t+￿ and as t
approaches 0 the optimal environmental tax approaches marginal damage.
It is very intuitive. Since the matching cost is also the index of monopoly
power and the lower the cost, the more competitive the market, in the limit
we approach the Pigouvian tax.





t + c2 ￿ c1
￿
: (18)
Note that the restriction for the market coverage is veri￿ed if and only if
c2 ￿ c1 ￿ t ￿ ￿ < ￿D0(￿X) < c2 ￿ c1 + t
2.1.2 Foreign monopoly and buyers￿tax
Assume that the monopoly is a foreign ￿rm and it cannot be regulated by
the national authority. Hence, the tax can only be imposed on buyers of the
polluting good. We will refer to such a tax as a buyers￿tax in contrast to
the producer￿ s tax set by the benevolent regulator in the previous section.
The case corresponds to the polluting consumption, not production. This
description ostensibly applies to the electricity sector generating electricity
either from green inputs (possibly renewable) or from fossil fuels supplied by
24OPEC. Market share of the monopolist is given by the indi⁄erent buyer X:
v ￿ p ￿ ￿￿ ￿ tX ￿ ￿X = v ￿ c2 ￿ t(1 ￿ X) which yields:
X(p;￿) =
c2 ￿ p + t ￿ ￿￿
2t + ￿
: (19)
From the pro￿t maximization condition (p ￿ c1)Xp + X(p;￿) = 0, the
monopoly charges a price e p(￿):
e p(￿) =
c1 + t + c2 ￿ ￿￿
2
: (20)
Contrary to the benchmark case, the taxation has an indirect impact on
monopoly price. The monopolist is indirectly taxed since it takes into account
the emission tax through the demand, which after some calculations equals:
X(e p(￿);￿) =
c2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ c1 + t
2(2t + ￿)
: (21)
Comparison of prices in (5) and (20) reveals that, contrary to direct taxation,
emission tax imposed on buyers decreases the monopoly price (as it a⁄ects
the demand, not the cost) and reduces the monopolist￿ s output (sales volume)
as in benchmark case. Thus, while the tax has a positive e⁄ect on price if
imposed on producer, it decreases the price if imposed on buyers.
In order to ensure positive market shares, we assume that 0 < X(e p(￿);￿) <
251, i.e., c2 ￿ c1 ￿ 3t ￿ 2￿ < ￿￿ < c2 ￿ c1 + t.






; if X(e p(￿);￿) > 1
2 then
e p(￿) + ￿￿ < c2. Moreover, when ￿ = 0 then setting the e⁄ective monopoly
price below competitive fringe￿ s cost implies that the monopolist captures over
half of the market.
When the environmental taxation makes the charge borne by buyers of
polluting variety lower than the charge of buying the clean variety, the mo-
nopolist￿ s market share becomes larger than the competitive fringe￿ s market
share.
Lemma 2. The overall e⁄ect of the emission tax on the monopolist￿ s demand
X(e p(￿);￿) is negative.
The direct e⁄ect of taxation dominates the indirect e⁄ect of the resulting
price change (dX
d￿ = Xpe p0(￿) + X￿ = ￿ ￿
2(2t+￿)). The impact on the marginal
buyer through the price change is positive but its magnitude does not over-
weight the direct impact of the emission tax and, thus, buyers buy less of
the dirty good relative to the case were no taxation was imposed.
The regulator chooses the environmental tax in order to maximize the
welfare. Recall that the economy consists of buyers only. For the regula-
tor, the monopoly distortion (price margin) is not an issue. For simplicity
consider that the regulator also internalizes the personal trouble, hence max-
26imizes the buyers￿welfare given by:
f W(￿) = v ￿ e p(￿)X(e p(￿);￿) ￿ c2[1 ￿ X(e p(￿);￿)]￿ (22)
￿D(￿X(e p(￿);￿)) ￿ T(X(e p(￿);￿)) ￿ F(X(e p(￿);￿));
where T(X(e p(￿);￿)) denotes the matching cost and F(X(e p(￿);￿)) personal
trouble as before.






, then the sum of the marginal
matching cost and personal trouble equals savings from consuming polluting
taxed variety, 2tX(p;￿)￿t+￿X = T 0(X(p;￿))+F 0(X(p;￿)) = c2￿p￿￿￿.
The result is somewhat di⁄erent than in the benchmark case. Marginal
matching cost is not equal to business switching e⁄ect as de￿ned previously
(c2 ￿ p).
Di⁄erentiating welfare with respect to the emission tax, we obtain:
f W
0(￿) = [c2 ￿ e p(￿) ￿ T




0(￿) + X￿] ￿ e p
0(￿)X:
The right-hand side of the equation above consists of two terms, indicating
that two e⁄ects that must be balanced: a demand e⁄ect and a price e⁄ect.
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of equation (23) re￿ ects the demand
27e⁄ect: the environmental tax has a negative impact on the monopolist￿ s
sales. Recall that, according to Lemma 2, the monopolist￿ s demand decreases
as a result of two opposite e⁄ects. Firstly, a direct e⁄ect of a tax which
makes the marginal buyer shift to the left. Secondly, an indirect e⁄ect of
the tax through the price decrease which obviously rises the monopolist￿ s
market share. The overall e⁄ect on demand, however, is negative, since the
direct e⁄ect overweights the indirect one. The sign of the ￿rst term (c2 ￿
e p(￿)), related to the switching of consumption from one product to another
is ambiguous. Assume it is negative. Then each buyer lost to the detriment
of the monopolist is a welfare gain from the regulator point of view. Not only
does the consumption switching decreases the pollution, but also it allocates
buyers to the cheaper supplier. The reverse is true when (c2￿e p(￿)) is positive.
The second term, ￿T 0(X(e p(￿);￿))) represents the marginal matching cost
which is positive. It is a welfare loss since the monopolist has less than half
of the market and the environmental tax increases further the matching cost,
which is socially detrimental. The third term, ￿F 0(X(e p(￿);￿)) represents the
marginal personal disutility and it is negative. Consequently, each buyer lost
represents a welfare gain. Finally, the pollution decreases, which is bene￿cial
for the society.
The price e⁄ect that can be seen in the second term on the right-hand
side of equation (23) is positive. It measures how changes in monopoly price
28a⁄ect buyers￿welfare. Since the monopoly price decreases with a tax11, it
is a welfare gain for the society. This stems from the externality that each
buyer of the monopolist￿ s variety exerts on the monopolist￿ s demand. When
deciding on which supplier to choose, a buyer does not take into account that
the choice of the monopolist￿ s variety makes the monopoly price increase,
thereby reducing the surplus of the other buyers. Since everyone purchasing
from the monopolist must pay more, the buyers￿welfare decreases. It turns
out that environmental tax also corrects this buyers￿externality.







￿[Xpe p0(￿~) + X￿]
: (24)
Proposition 3: The optimal tax rate is ￿~ = D0(￿X)+
Xp0
￿[Xpp0+X￿]. It accounts
for the external damage and buyers￿externality.
Note that the second part of the optimal tax is unambiguously positive.
Since taxation indirectly alleviates buyers￿charges, stricter environmental
regulation is called for. As regulator is only concerned with buyers￿surplus,
the optimal tax is meant to internalize both the environmental externality
and the externality that each buyer of the monopolist￿ s variety exerts on oth-
11It is a known result from the tax incidence literature. The price received by producers
may fall with a tax depending on the inverse supply function. In our case, marginal cost
is constant. In such a case, the price received by producer decreases only if the ￿rm has
a monopoly power. See [18] pp.323.
29ers. Clearly, the optimal buyers￿tax here will be higher than the producer￿ s
tax imposed by the previous benevolent regulator.









c2 ￿ c1 + t
3￿
: (25)
Obviously, the buyers￿tax does not restore the ￿rst best. It can be easily
checked that in benchmark case, both the producer￿ s and the buyer￿ s tax lead
to the ￿rst best result12. In the present case the di⁄erence between both taxes
comes from the fact that the monopolist no longer contributes to the social
welfare. Since monopolist￿ s pro￿t is no longer a component of the welfare,
the optimal market share from the regulator￿ s point of view diminishes.
The conditions for positive market shares for both ￿rms must be satis￿ed.
Green fringe is not evicted from the market if and only if 5t > c2￿c1￿3￿ ￿
￿D0(￿X). Monopolist￿ s market share is positive if t > ￿D0(￿X) + c1 ￿ c2.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze optimal taxation under imperfect competition. The
industry structure under consideration is a monopoly faced with a competi-
12Welfare maximization with national monopolist and byer￿ s tax leads to a condition:
c2 ￿ c1 = T0(X) + ￿D0(￿X) + F0(X) yielding optimal tax: ￿￿ = 2D0(￿X) ￿ c2￿c1+t
￿ . This
gives the indi⁄erent utility equal to XFB and prices p = c2 + t ￿ ￿D0(X￿).
30tive fringe supplying a green alternative to buyers with heterogeneous tastes.
We ￿nd that the optimal tax di⁄ers from the Pigouvian marginal damage.
Not only must the environmental authority consider the market power of a
supplier but also he must take into account the existence of a green alter-
native. A third type of distortion appears due to buyers￿heterogeneity: the
allocative one. We show that the optimal tax consists of four e⁄ects: the
standard Pigouvian marginal damage, the monopoly subsidy, the matching
e⁄ect and the business-switching e⁄ect. The business-switching e⁄ect de-
creases the value of a tax if the green alternative is much more expensive
than the monopolistic good. Finally, the heterogeneity of buyers imposes an
additional e⁄ect, namely the cost of matching the preferences for buyers who
deviate from the market center. However, when the regulator is "empathic",
the business-switching e⁄ect is shown to split the market in a socially desir-
able way. The presence on the market of a clean variety sold at marginal
cost does not distort the market allocation more than what would prevail if
the polluting variety were the only one on the market. If, on the contrary,
he is "non-empathic", the optimal tax is shown to be even smaller because
part of the externality is already internalized by consumers￿environmental
awareness. If buyers are the only ones to be taxed, then the optimal tax is a
bit di⁄erent and its magnitude is increased if the producer reacts negatively
to environmental taxation. Lastly, we show that if the monopoly is a foreign
￿rm, its demand is decreased with respect to the previous case when the
31monopolist￿ s pro￿t was a part of the regulator￿ s objective.
The analysis presented above can be applied to several industries, like the
electricity and transportation industry. Both of them are passing through
a stage of increased development of green rival products, be it a renewable
sources of energy or bio-fuels. However, we did not consider the budget bal-
ance of the government, neither did we consider availability of the abatement
technology. These extensions are left for future research.
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